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A major benefit of education is the lower risk of
unemployment at higher educational levels. In PSID (Panel Study
of Income Dynamics) data on the male labor force1 the reduction
of the incidence of unemployment is found to be far more
important than the reduced duration of unemployment in creating
the educational differentials in unemployment rates. In turn,
the lesser unemployment incidence of the more educated workers
is, in about equal measure, due to their greater attachment to
the firms employing them, and to the lesser risk of becoming
unemployed when separated from the firm.
The lesser frequency of job turnover of more educated
workers, which creates fewer episodes of unemployment, is in
large part attributable to more on-the-job training.
In explaining the lesser conditional unemployment of
educated workers and the somewhat shorter duration of their
unemployment, indirect evidence is provided that (1) costs of
on-the-job search for new employment relative to costs of
searching while unemployed are lower for more educated workers;
(2) that these workers are also more efficient in acquiring and
processing job search information; and (3) that firms and workers
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COMPONENTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND DIFFERENTIALS BY EDUCATION
Accounting Schemes and Gross Differentials
Educatedworkers enjoy at least three basic advantages over less educated workers in the labor
market:higher wages, greater upward mobilityin income andoccupation,'andgreater employment
stability.An immense literature is available on the wage structure by education; much less research is
devoted to mobility and unemployment aspects of education. This study explores the relation between
education of workers and their unemployment experience. That this relation is negative is well known
from nearly ubiquitous observation.2 But the reasons for it have not been subjected to thorough
scrutiny.
The approach we take is to analyze several aspects of labor market behavior which combine to
affect the unemployment rate of a group of workers. The analysis is facilitated by a decomposition of
the unemployment rate into factors which correspond to somewhat distinct behavioral aspects. The
same rate can obtain if more workers experience unemployment for a shorter time or fewer for a
longer time. The probability of leaving employment, which we call unemployment incidence, is
separable from, though not unrelated to, the probability of leaving unemployment, that is, to its
duration.
The decomposition of the unemployment rate (u) is best seen if we define it as the fraction of
time lost by all members of the labor force within a unit period, say a year: Let L be the number of
workers in the labor force, Wk(l) the number of weeks in the labor force, N the number of workers
who experienced unemployment, and WK(u) their weeks of unemployment. Thus, the average weekly
unemployment rate is:
On occupation, see Nachum Sicherman (1987).
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Here,incidence, or the probability of unemployment is L,whileD is the average duration of
unemployment for those who experienced it, and D0 is the average number of weeks out of the labor
force of all workers; dg and d0 represent fractions of time spent in unemployment and out of the labor
force, by the unemployed and by all workers respectively. Equation I shows that the unemployment
rate of a group of workers is the productoftheir probability of experiencing unemployment P(u)
during the time they are in the labor force, and of the fraction of labor force time spent in
unemployment of those who experience unemployment (d.,).
Going behind the incidence factor, we note that:
(2) P(u)=P(s)P(u/s)
whichis to say that the probability of being unemployed in the period depends on the probability of
having separated from the previous job P(s), and on the probability of encountering unemployment
while separated. If restricted to job changes in the labor market,' equation 2 points to the significance
of labor mobility or turnover, and to on-the-job search as (partly distinct) behavioral factors affecting
incidence. Off-the-job search behavior is, presumably, the basic content of the duration of
unemployment.
Combining equations 1 and 2, the composition of the unemployment rate is:4
Separation can be generalized to include labor force entrants and exits. In the current report it is restricted
to job changes.
1
The last term is ignored intheempirical analyses of workers who arc (almost) continuously in the
labor force.
3(3)
Table I illustrates the fact that each of the components of unemployment gets smaller as the
level of education in the group increases.3
ft is worth noting that the behavioral data shown in Table 1 are rather closely duplicated by
subjective expectations of workers. Two surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center
in 1977 and 1978 asked a nationwide sample of employed workers whether they expect to lose their
jobs in the next 12 months, and whether they could easily find another comparable job if they were
separated from their current firm.' Interpreting the responses to the first question as expectations
about P(u), and the second as expectations about P(u/s)? compare column I of Table Ia with row 2 in
Table 1 and column 2 of Table la with row 4 in Table 1.
The statement refers to each row in Table 1. Comparisons of levels within columns are distorted by
differences in sources and definitions of data. Ratios in the last column are comparable.
MonthlyLaborReview, April 1980.
Perhaps the relative difficulty of finding another job (col. 2 of Table Ia) is more properly compared with
P(u/s) x D. Either way the results are similar.
4Table I
EDUCATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPONENTS
Some Cross (unadjusted) Facts
Ed <12 12 13-15 16+
16+
Key to variables
u* 7.0 4.1 3.3 1.9 3.7unemployment rate
P(u) 9.5 6.4 4.7 3.5 2.7probability (incidence)
ofunemployment
P(s) 17.9 13.4 12.8 10.5 1.7probability of
separation
P(ufs) 53.2 48.6 37.8 33.2 1.6probability of
unemployment of job
separators
Du 13.8 12.1 11.6 11.0 1.26duration of
unemployment of job
separators (in weeks)
LFFb 92.1 97.0 96.4 98.2 .94labor force rate
'BLS data, White Men, age 25-54, in 1979
bBLSdata, same, age 35-44, in 1979
All other rows: PSID, White Men, years 1976-81, 11-25 years of work experience.
Returning to Table 1, unemployment of the least educated (<12 years) groups of male workers
is typically over 3 times higher than that of the most educated (16+) groups. This ratio (B)shownin
the last column of Table I can be decomposed following our equations, into products of component
ratios, all of which are shown in the last column of Table 1.
Thus,
(4)R(u) =RP(s)RP(ufs) R(d,)
1.7x1.6 x1.26x 1.06 3.5
=2.7x 1.3
5Table Ia
WORKEREXPECTATIONS ABOUT JOB LOSS AND






Grade School 9.0 51.2
High School 8.8 43.1
Some Coltege 9.0 31.6
College Degree 2.7 37.8
Graduate Work 1.3 27.7
Source: Monthly Labor Review, April, 1980, p. 53.
Here incidence of unemployment is 170% greater, but duration is only 30% greater in the least
educated compared to the most educated group. Clearly, duration of unemployment is a relatively
minor aspect of the educational unemployment differentials, a finding familiar from previous
research.
However, if the distinction is not between the probability of losing employment and that of
leaving unemployment, but between labor mobility across firms and both on-the-jobandoff-the-job
searchbehavior, we find that:
(5)R(u) =RP(s) x Remainder=1.7x2.0,where the remainder.. .RP(u/s)R(du)
While incidence is far more important than duration, job search behavior (on and off the job)
is as important as job turnover in affecting the educational unemployment differentials.
See Ashenfelter and Ham (1979).
6Net Unemployment Differentials by Education
Table 1 illustrated the patterns of educational unemployment differentials from various data
sources. These differentials are gross, not standardized for other worker characteristics. We proceed
to a description of the net or partial effects of education, in the presence of such characteristics. In
this effort, we restrict the sample to adult white males, non-students, age 18-60. We consider
unemployment of job changers only, so that recall unemployment and that of labor force entrants and
exits is excluded. These exclusions are, in part, necessitated by the imperfections of our data.
Although we may lose close to a half of the usually observed unemployment by these exclusions, the
patterns of unemployment by education ate quite similar9 whether or not we make the exclusions.
However, the behavioral analysis pertains most directly to the group we study.
The PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) sample we use contains observations on about
1,200 males in years 1976-1983, with some differences in temporal coverage, depending on
availability of survey questions. The effective size of the samples varies also due to missing or faulty
observations.
Table 2 shows the relation between education and the incidence of unemployment P(u), and its
components P(s) and P(u/s), net of other measured worker characteristics. In the linear specification of
Table 2 (column 2), each additional year of schooling reduces the probability of unemployment by
1.3% points at given levels of working age ("experience").'0 The effect is smaller (.8%) when other
variables, especially training in the firm, are included. Looking across the row of coefficients on
education, we see that both separation probabilities P(s) and conditional unemployment (i.e.,
unemployment of movers) P(u/s) are reduced by education.
The reduction in turnover and the lesser exposure to unemployment of those who turn over
bring about the reduction in unemployment incidence of the better educated in just about equal
measure. From the definition of P(u) in equation 2, we have
Some preliminary evidence suggests that inclusions would actually steepen the relationsobservedhere. See
first column in Table 2.





The effects of education on the incidence of unemployment are reduced somewhat when
additional variablesareadded in column 3 of Table 2. The (net) effect of education on the duration of
unemployment, after standardization for other factors and characteristics, is shown in the first column
of Table 6. An additional year of education (at Ed =12)reduced duration of unemployment by nearly
one week.
This effect amounts to about one-fourth of the decline in the unemployment rate due to an
additional year of schooling. Since, in our sample, u =P(u)d(u), the derivative is:
(7)—- d(u) + - . P(u)
8Ed öEd 8Ed
Giventhat d(u) was, on average,u close to .24, and the mean (at Ed =12)of P(u) =.06,
.-1.32x.24-2.4x.06
(—.32 -.12)
As in the unadjusted data(equation4 above), the importance of education in reducing
unemployment is nearly three times as great via reduction of turnover than via reduction of duration.
Assuming an average of 50 weeksperyear in the laborforce.
8TERM BY TERM ANALYSIS
Reasons for Lower Turnover P(s) at Higher Education Levels
In employing human capital analysis it is important to distinguish the more comprehensive
concept of investments in human capital from investments in school education. According to early
calculations, (returns on) investments in school education—in dollar volumes—represent no more than
a half of (returns on) total human capital investments. Investments in job learning and training, in
information, and labor mobility represent the other half of the total volumes.12
While higher wage trajectories of the more educated workers reflect returns on investments in
schooling, patterns of wage growth and of turnover of workers are, in principle, related to training and
learning in the labor market, not in school. Therefore, the relations that are observed—steeper wage
growth and greater attachment to the firm for the more educated worker—are causally indirect. It is
because jobtrainingtends to be (a) positively related to schooling, and (b) negatively related to
turnover that we observe a negative relation between education and turnover.
Consequently, we break our questions into three parts: (a) Is job training positively related to
education, and why? (b) Is turnover negatively related to job training, and why? and (c) Does
education affect labor mobility apart from its correlation with training?
(a) is job training positively related to education andwhy? Directinformation on volumes of
job training is provided in the PSID surveys of 1976 and 1978. The measure we use (RQT) is given
by respondents' answers to a question: "On a job like yours, how long would it take the average new
person to become fully trained and qualified?" The question followed several other questions about
training prior to the current job, and it "was intended to measure the volume of the training investment
attached to the current job."t3
2 This is net of investments in health which represent investments in "maintenance and repairs" of human
capital (Mincer, 1974).
3 A check on whether the RQT measures in the PSID refer to the length of current training in the firm or to
total (cumulated) on-the-job training needed for the particular job was performed by Sicherman (1987). A
comparison by detailed occupation in PSID responses with DOT (Dictionary of Occupational Titles) estimates
supports the assertion that RQT is not a cumulative measure antedating the current firm for most occupations, except
for a minority of highly skilled professional occupations where RQT is overstated. When added to probably sizable
errors of measurement this discrepancy creates an additional downward bias on estimates of effects of RQT in
9That volumes of job training are positively related to school education of workers (when other
characteristics are taken into account) is shown in Table 4 (column 1). In the PSID surveys conducted
annually by the Institute for Social Researeh, University of Michigan, volumes of training were
measured by the length of time in training and learning on the current job required for reaching a
proficient ("fully qualified') level of productivity in the job.
Although this measure is far from accurate and ignores intensity (hours per period) of
training,'4 results shown in Table 4 (column 1) are supported in other data sets utilized by other
investigators. In the most comprehensive study, Lillard and Tan (1986) analyzed the distribution of
training across workers in larger and, in some respects, more detailed CPS and NLS samples. The
training measure in both data sets is its incidence in the year before the survey. The location of
training (whether in or outside of firms) is also indicated. (Our PSID data aim at in-firm training).
Their findings regarding the incidence of training by education—with similar standardizing
variables—provides strong support for the inferences based on Table 4 here.
But why do more educated workers engage in more on-the-job training? The general answer
is that persons who have greater learning ability arid better opportunities to finance the costs of human
capital investments do invest more in all forms of human capital, including schooling and job training.
Although this answer is sufficient, some analysts claim, in addition, that school education is a
complementary factor to job training in producing human capital. In other words, education enhances
the productivity of job training at work. It is clear, however, that schooling can also be a substitute
for job training: thus, the decline in apprenticeships has been attributed to growth in educational
levels over the long-run.
One direct test of complementarity fails in Table 4 (column 2): the coefficient of the
interaction of education and training in the wage equation is not significant. However, the same test
statistical regressions.
14
Supplementaryinformation on intensity is available in a 1980 study of PSID time budgets by Duncan and
Stafford (1980). It contains data on the proportion of workers who were engaged in job training during the survey
week and the hours spent in training by those engaged in it. Both components and thcir product increase with
education (except for the highest level (16+)). Our measure (RQT) is, therefore, not misleading in terms of direction
of effect of schooling on training.
10applied to upward occupational mobility (or wage growth in the long run) was positive (Sicherman,
1987). The wage equation in Table 4 also reveals another reason for a link between education and
training: both are more profitable where productivity growth (PG) is more rapid.
(b)Is turnover negatively related to education, and why? Wesaw in Table 2 that job training
(measured by RQT) has a negative effect on separation rates, that is to say, it reduces the probability
of leaving the firm in which training was received.15 The reason is that training which enhances skill
and productivity in the firm is not fully transferable to otherwise comparable jobs in other firms.
Since training processes at work tend to be integrated with production processes. idiosyncrasies in the
latter create some degree of firm specificity in training. Consequently, workers who acquire large
volumes of training on the job are less likely to move from one firm to another. Similarly, employers
are less likely to lay off such workers (permanently) if they share in the costs and returns to training.
Indirect evidence of such cost-sharing appears in the negative effects of training on quits and layoffs,
in separate regressions.'6 We may conclude that the observed negative relation between education
and turnover is, in part, attributable to the positive correlation between education and on-the-job
training.
(C)Does education affect labor mobility,apartfrom (net of) its correlation with training?
Theanswer is provided in Table 2, where the effect of education on turnover is reduced, but remains
negative after training is introduced ("held constant') in the P(s) regression, suggesting that factors
other than training may be important as well.
One possibility is that firms with high fixed labor costs—such as costs of screening, hiring,
and fringes which do not depend on hours or work—will aim to cut these costs by reducing turnover.
This may be done by selecting more productive, capable, and stable workers, substituting adjustments
in hours for adjustments in employment, and postponing rewards to workers in the form of steeper
wage growth and/or of pensions. In substituting quality for quantity of employment, such firms tend
to hire larger proportion of better educated workers. Information on the amount of fixed labor costs is
'Foradditional evidence see Mincer (1987).
Ibid.
11scarcc. However, many firms that axe large andmorecapital intensive (the two tend to be
correlated) are likely to havehigher fixedcosts of employment and therefore tend to engage in the
above described policies in order to reduce turnover. Of course, another reason for lesser turnover in
large firms is that their size permits job changes and, especially, upward mobility within the firm, thus
limiting inter-firm mobility. There is abundant evidence that larger firms employ larger proportions of
better educated workers, and that turnover is lower in such finns.t'
It may also be true that more educated persons are more efficient in job matching, that is in
finding suitable employment with less job shopping—resulting therefore in lesser turnover. If
matching gains are equated with wage gains in moving from one firm to another, the proposition is
testable and we do find that wage gains (in percent terms) are greater for more educated workers (see
Table 6) who move, especially by quitting.1'
The greater mobility gain of educated workers, in part results from their longer distance
geographic migration, in which costs and therefore returns are higher. Indeed, geographic mobility is
an exception to the proposition that more educated workers engage in lesser job mobility. While
lesser mobility of more educated workers holds within local markets, and local mobility dominates the
overall picture,2° geographic mobility increases with education. Indeed inter-regional migration is
twice as frequent among workers with 16 or more years of schooling than for those with 12 or less.
Of course, having migrated, educated workers stay much longer on the job and in the new locality
than do others (DaVanzo, 1983).
The apparent contradiction between effects of education on local and on geographic job
mobility can be reconciled on the following grounds: Although educated workers change jobs less
frequenUy, when they do, they are more likely to migrate geographically. It should be noted that most
"
See,however, 01(1962), and Mincer and Higuchi (1988).
For a summary of a growing literature, see Idson (1986).
See also Table 4 in Mincer (1986).
Geographic mobility amounts to about 25% of total job mobility inCensusdata. It was Less than 20% Lflthe
PS ID.
12job changers have accumulatedvery littleofspecific capital,2' thatthisisespeciallytrueofyoung
workers,and that migrationisespecially selectiveofyoung workers. Atthesame time, jobsearehby
themore educated is likely to be more efficient where information is less complete(suchas inlong
distanceopportunities) because they accumulatemore information andprocessinformation more
efficiently.Indeed, educational selectivity is greater the longer the distance (e.g., in interstate vs.
intercounty migration), and return migration is much less frequent among more educated than less
educated migrants (DaVanzo, 1983).
The purpose of this section was to explore the negative relation between education and labor
turnover, because the latter is an important component of unemployment incidence. The following
factors appear to give nse to this relation: job training which is partially specific to the firm, high
turnover costs which induce firms to substitute schooled and trained workers for others, more intensive
screening by firms, and more efficient job search of more educated workers.
Tied to these factors are sources of demand for educated workers in the labor market: firms in
which training is important, firms in which turnover costs are high, large finns, and firms in
geographically diversified industries. At the sectoral (industry) level we can add two additional
sources: sectors with more rapid productivity growth, and sectors in whkh product demand, hence
employment demand, is stable.
That demand for educated workers is greater in industries with more rapidly growing
productivity is evident in Table 4 (column 2): the return to education (and to training) is greater in
sectors with more rapid productivity gmwth.
Industries in which employment fluctuations are mild are also likely to demand more educated
labor. This is because training is less risky in stable industries, as capital losses due to infrequent
layoffs are smaller. Since more training is received by the more educated workers, more of the latter
are hired and sort themselves to such industries. The evidence is shown in Table 5, where sectoral
Most job movers had short tenures in the firm they left.
u Similar and related findings were obtained by Lilard and Tan (1986) and in Japanese data (Mincer and
Higuchi, 1988). Reasons were analyzed by DaVanzo (1983) and in Banel and Lichtenberg (1987).
13instability is measured by unemployment incidence of high school graduates, showing that the
proportion of workers with over 12 or with 16+ yeai of scbooling as well as frequency of training are
inversely related to instability.23
Reasons for Lower Unemployment of Job Changers P(u/s) at Higher Educational Levels
As we saw in Table 2, more educated job changers are less likely to experience unemployment
in the transition to a new job. The probability of becoming unemployed upon separation P(u/s)
depends, in part, on whether the separation was a quit or a layoff, since close to 70% of layoffs but
only 25-30% of quits become unemployed. Indeed, more educated job changers are somewhat less
likely to separate by layoff than by quit (column 3 in Table 3). But this is a minor part of the reason
for the lesser probability of unemployment of educated job changers. The major pan is played by the
lesser probability of unemployment of educated job changers both in quits and in layoffs.
This conclusion is based on the sizes of the coefficients of the education variables in Table 3.
Given that, by definition:
(8) P(us)iuiP(u/L). +P(u/Q)(1
where P represents conditional probabilities of unemployment, given separation (s), layoffs (L), and
quits (Q),respectively.





At the means of education (Ed =12)and of Li'S (.4), the numerical value of the last term is no
more than one sixth of the total effect.
23
Instabilityhere is an industry characteristic, not a consequence of more training received by more educated
workers.
14We know by now that more educatedworkersare less likely than others to quit or to be laid
off. But why are they less exposed to unemployment when they do quit or are laid off? The general
answer to this question lies in job search behavior of workers and hiring efforts of firms.
It is important to realize that job search of workers takes place both on the job (while
employed) and off-the-job (while unemployed). (Indeed, over half of all job changes occur without
unemployment, involving search or accepting offers while employed.) The proportion is even greater
among the more educated, who are more likely to search on the job rather than off-the-job. A basic
reason from the worker's point of view is that the cost of off-the-job search (while unemployed)
relative to the cost of on-the-job search is greater for the more educated. Larger foregone earnings
and smaller unemployment compensation offsets make search off-the-job more costly, while greater
efficiency in accumulating information and greater flexibility in time at work lower the cost of on the
job search. Consequently, while over 40% of less educated (Ed<12) quitters quit into unemployment
in order to search, only 20% of the more educated (16+) do so.
The greater stock of information and greater efficiency in search can also account for the
lesser risk of unemployment of more educated workers who are laid off, provided layoff notices permit
some time for search on the job, and especially if the more educated workers are more likely to
receive advance notices of layoff. Indeed, a recent study by Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1987) indicates
that (a) workers who receive advance notices of layoff or of plant shutdown are less likely to
experience unemployment, and (b) advance notices are more likely to be received in plants where
proportions of skilled blue-collar workers and of college educated workers are larger. The study also
shows that, given advance notice, the laid off more educated white collar workers are less likely to
become unemployed.
On the hiring side, one would expect a greater intensity of search for more educated workers
by firms, since costs of unfilled vacancies for skilled jobs, in terms of foregone production, are clearly
higher. Hence more educated workers are likely to receive offers from other firms while they are
15employed elsewhere. In other words, the costs of search shift in part to employers as education of
workers rises.
Direct evidence on the informational efficiency in job search of educated workers is not
available. Indirect evidence of migration behavior was cited before. Greater wage gains in job
changing will be shown in the next section together with other evidence on efficiency which applies
both to on-the-job and off-the-job search.
JobSearch and the Duration of Unemployment
The hypothesesconcerning search efficiencyofworkers and greater search effort of employers
in hiring educated workers apply to workers' search on as well as off-the-job.Thesehypotheses
provideexplanationfortheeducational patterns ofunemploymentdurations and of wage gains in
moving, both observable in our data.
To understand the findings about effects of education on unemployment of job changers, its
duration, and on wage gains in moving, we view them as implications of a theoretical model of job
search. It can be described, in a simplified mainer, as follows:
Workers sample from sets of ahernative wages available in potential jobs (the set is called the
"wage offer distribution") finding at least one vacancy per unit of time with probability p. The
worker's strategy in accepting a job offer is to decide on a minimum acceptable wage ("wage floor")
which equates the gain from an additional period of search to the cost of it. Formally, the decision
rule (see Appendix I) is:
(10) (W— Wm)C, wherek[1
—
Costs (c) axe on the right side of equation 10; gains on the left.
Another reason for this shift (proposed by Stigler, 1962) is that the ratio of workers to potential employers
declines at higher education levels.
See Note I in Appendixfor derivauon.For an extensive survey of job search models see Mortensen (1987).
16Since gains accrue over a long period following accession to a new job, their capital value
1
appears on the left hand side of equation 10, when divided by the discount rate i. The termis
k=(1-(
1
multiplied by 1 +i acorrection for the finite payoff period t.Theshorter the period
the smaller the gain (k<1 and declines as tdeclines).
These concepts are easily visualized in a graph:
Figure 1. Wage Offer Distribution
Wd =acceptancewage
P4 P(W> W) =areato the right of W•
=meanwage in the truncated area
The probability of finding a vacancy is p, so the probability of finding an acceptable job is
(pP1).
The cost of search includes opportunity costs of time (C0), direct costsofsearch (travel,
communications, and of other forms of acquiring information) (C0). Income offsets (z) which are
contingent on continuing search, such as unemployment compensation, enter costs with a negative
sign: thus c=c0 +Cd-Z. Thediscount factor Kdependson time preference, on the terms of credit
available to the worker, and on the expected duration of the next job (t). Duration of unemployment






wDecision rule (equation 10) contains several factors differing by education, which determine
both the durationof searchunemployment and the minimal acceptable wage in the new job.
The model produces several important implications:
1. The lower the cost of search (c), the more time the worker can afford to spend
searching and choosing among alternatives, and the higher the wage demanded.
2. The lower the discount rate (i) and the longer the expected stay on the new job, the
greater future gains loom relative to current costs. The result is longer duration of
search and better terms (here W) on the new job resulting from the more thorough
search.
3. The higher the probability of finding a vacancy (j').themore likely is a worker to find
an acceptable job during a given period. Hence the duration of search is likely to be
shorter, and the new wage likely to be obtained is higher.26
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26 Onaverage, the new wage equals,whichexceeds
18Variations (across people) in costs of search(per unitof calendar time), in ease of financing
(i), and in the expected payoff period (t) induce the same direction of effect on duration as on the
acceptance wages. Only variations in (p), the efficiency of search, produce opposite signs.
In the first column of the diagram we assume variations that distinguish more from less
educated workers. Cost (c) of search (given its efficiency) is assumed to be higher per unit of
calendar time, the discount rate (I) lower, expected stay in the new firm (t) longer, and probability of
finding a vacancy (p) per unit of calendar time greater.
The analysis may be described as follows: cost of search, c (on the right side of our decision
rule, equation 10), is likely to be higher for educated workers because of their greater foregone
earnings and lesser offset by unemployment compensation. Of the left side variables, the discount rate
i. reflecting the ease of financing search as well as time preference, is likely to be lower—as this is a
factor, in addition to ability, which induced greater investment in education in the first place.
Empirical evidence from Table 7, utilized in Appendix Note 2, confirms this hypothesis. Because of
lower i and greater ability, educated workers also benefit more from all other forms of human capital,
including information and training. Therefore, their search is snore informed and they expect to
continue training and learning on the next job. Hence they expect to stay longer in the new job than
the less educated job changers do. The greater accumulation of information in turn raises p, the
efficiency of search. The lower i and higher k and p raise the value of the gain from search.
We already alluded to several factors affecting efficiency. As just indicated, efficiency is not
exogenous. It is affected by incentives of workers and firms to acquire information about alternative
jobs and employees, and to search more intensively. Formally, we can express p (the probability of
finding vacancies per unit of (calendar time) as a function:
(12)p =p(v,x; e1,
Here r is the intensity of search (hours per week spent in search), x- other expenditures, such
as advertising, transportation, ctc. Educated workers have an incentive to spend more resources (r and
x) in order to shorten the period of unemployment, which is more costly in terms of foregone earnings
to them compared to other workers. Evidence on greater job search intensity of more educated
workers is available in Barron and Mellow (1979) and in Zuckerman (1982), based on a Bureau of
19Labor Statisticssurvey of unemployed workers (1976) and (1973). The greater investment in
(accumulation of) jobmarketinformation appears in a larger e1,personalefficiency variable,and the
greater intensity ofsearchbyemployers formore educated workers appears in the market efficiency
variableem.Indirect evidence on e and Cmwascited before.27 In support of a larger em, there is also
evidence thatmore educated workers arelessvulnerablein cyclical declines, partly becausethey are
employedinmorestablesectors(Table5), and that greater demandfor educated workers is generated
by economicgrowth, as seen in the positive coefficient on Ed x PG in Table 4, and in other recent
studies.2'
Comparing more educated to less educated workers, using decision rule (equation 10), we see
k
that the rightside (c) is raised, but so is the left side, because of higher p and .Theempirical
k
findingssuggests that the product pincreases (with education) more than the opportunity CoSt C.29
The adjustment to achieve optimum results in search when gains exceed costs is to equate the
two sides of equation 10 by raising the acceptance wage W1. This reduces the conditional probability
P1. but the unconditional probability of finding an acceptable job (p.P1) may remain higher after the
d1
adjustment.'°Duration of seaith, therefore, may decline, since
'Directevidence on the number of contacts with potential employers during the previous month shows that
it was larger for the more educated unemployed searchers in the sample of Table 7. Similar evidence is reported
by Yoon (1981) for earlier periods. This evidence reflects greater efficiency or greater intensity of search. Holzer
(1988) reports greater diversity of search methods by more educated young unemployed workers in the NLS.
Generally, he finds this variable reduces the duration of unemployment as well. 'SeeBartel and Lichtenberg (1987), Lillard and Tan (1986), Mincer and Higuchi (1988).
Note 2 in Appendix uses data of Table 7 to test the proposition.
°Forproofs see Flinn and Hcckman (1983). The theorem they prove is that the (negative) elasticity of P with
respectto p is less than unity. This guarantees a reduction in duration of search when its efficiency (p) increases.
Note that when a higher (rather than p) distinguishes more from less educated workers, duration of search increases.
Our empirical findings indicate that p dominates the educational differentials.
20The opposite scenario, wherecostsc increase more than gains in equation 10 wouldproduce
theopposite effects; reservation wages would be reduced and duration of search increased for more
compared to less educated workers. This scenario is decisively rejected by the empirical findings in
Tables 6 and 7.
Note that for empirical purposes (Tables 6 and 7), we are equating duration of unemployment
with duration of search, and that both reservation wages and wages on the new job are deflated
(divided) by the wage on the old job (W0). Since W1>W1, it must be true thatw0 i.e.,
percent gains in wages are larger the higher the reservation wages. Deflation by W0 is necessary in
order to standardize (keep fixed) the level of the wage offer distribution, which differs by education.
Reservation wages of workers unemployed during the survey were reported in 1980-1982.
Table 7 shows that moves up with education of job changers in quits and in layoffs with and
(f) withoutunemployment. Wage gains•movecorrespondingly.
The behavior of variables in the decision rule equation 10 is similar for on-the-job searchers,
k
andperhaps less ambiguous than in the case of unemployed searchers. p andare greater for
more educated workers whether or not they are employed. They also have lower costs of on-the-job
search, if they are more flexible in their use of work time, while the unemployed may have somewhat
less efficiency than the employed—as evidenced by their winding up in unemployment. Wage gains
are indeed larger for employed than for unemployed searchers (Table 7). We conclude that P(u/s),
discussed in the previous section, is smaller among more educated workers not only because they find
There are very few layoffs among employed movers, hence only total separations are shown for them in Table
7.
21it more economical to search on- rather than off-the-job, but also because their search is more
efficient. The fact, shown earlier, that education reduces conditional unemployment P(u/s) to a greater
extent than it reduces the duration of unemployment is also consistent with this analysis.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
A major benefit of education in the labor market is the lower risk of unemployment at higher
levels of education. In order to understand this relation, we analyze several aspects of unemployment
which combine to produce the usually reported unemployment rates. We find that the reduction of the
incidence of unemployment, that is of the probability of experiencing unemployment in a calendar
period, is far more important than the reduced duration of unemployment in creating the educational
differentials in unemployment rates. While this finding is not new, further analyses of components
and factors in the incidence and duration of unemployment yield insights into the relevant behavior of
workers and finns in the labor market.
The behavioral phenomena of basic importance are: training processes in firms, and search of
workers and finns for one another. These phenomena are not quite unrelated, although they are
analytically separable. We find that the lesser unemployment incidence of the more educated workers
is, in about equal measure, due to their greater attachment to the firms employing them, and to the
lesser risk of entering unemployment when separated from the firm. This lesser risk applies to both
quits and layoffs and is. only in small part, due to the somewhat greater likelihood of quit than of
layoff among the more educated job changers.
The lesser frequency of job turnover of more educated workers, which creates fewer episodes
of unemployment, is in large part attributable to a greater likelihood of their engaging in on-the-job
training. Because such training contains elements of firm specificity, its costs tend to be shared by
workers and firms, and turnover, both in quits and in layoffs, is reduced. It should be understood that
job training and learning is a comprehensive concept, not restricted to formal training programs or
apprenticeships in firms.
Factors other than job training also play a role in the greater firm attachment of educated
workers. Firms which bear relatively high fixed labor costs—in terms of hiring, screening.
fringes—tend to substitute both physical and human capital for less skilled labor. Large flims, which
22tend to have higher fixed labor costs, recruit larger proportions of educated workers, whose turnover is
lower. Training costs are, of course, also a part of fixed costs and, indeed, there is evidence that
screening costs tend to correlate with training costs.
In explaining the lesser conditional unemployment of educated workers and the somewhat
lesser duration of their unemployment, we focus on search behavior. Moving from one firm to
another without unemployment implies search on the job. The lesser risk of unemployment in job
changing suggest greater efficiency of on-the-job search. We provide largely indirect evidence that (I)
costs of on-the-job search relative to costs of searching while unemployed are lower for more educated
workers; (2) that these workers are also more efficient in acquiring and processing job search
information; and (3) that firms and workers search more intensively to fill more skilled vacancies.
AU three reasons explain the more successful on-the-job search of the more educated workers.
The second and third apply to off-the-job search as well. However, efficiency of search is not the
only factor affecting duration of search unemployment. Three other factors: opportunity costs, the
rate at which the future is discounted, and the expected length of the payoff period, that is of duration
of stay on the next job, have conflicting implications for the duration of search. Information on wage
gains in moving is useful in disentangling these contradictory forces. We conclude that the somewhat
shorter duration of unemployment coupled with larger wage gains from search is due to the
dominating effect of greater efficiency and intensity of search in the market for educated labor.
The interrelation between human capital investment behavior and search behavior can be seen
in the following mutual links: since educated workers tend to invest more in training, they expect to
continue doing so when they move to the next firm. Consequently they expect to stay at a firm longer
than other workers. According to the economic model they will, therefore, search more thoroughly
(though, as we have seen, not necessarily longer), and obtain greater wage gains in moving, as we
observed.
32SeeBarron ct al (1986): also, Mincer and Higuchi (1988).
23At thesametime, the more informed the search, the more likely is a successful job match,
hencethe longer are workers likely to stayonthe next job." Thus search efficiency,which is
characteristic of educated workers, may be an additional factor in their lesser turnover.
Havingrestrictedour sample basically to workers who are in almost continuous
employment—white men,non-students, age 18-60,wecouldignore non-participation including entries
into and exits from the labor force as components of unemployment. The bottom row of Table I
showed that for our sample, the differences by education are negligible, except for the least educated
(Ed<12) high school dropouts. The entry probabilities are likely to be higher for the more educated
because they have fewer difficulties in finding jobs—as was shown in our search analysis. Lesser
probability of leaving the labor force are suggested by the likelihood of greater training on the job: to
the extent that the training is specific, losses of human capital deter workers from leavingthe
employing firm whetherit is to go to another or to leave the labor force. But even when the training
is transferable to other firms, as most of it tends to be, leaving employment for a longer time can
erode the acquired human capital. Consequently more educated workers are less likely to drop out and
stay out. In analyzing labor force groups in which continuity of employment is far from permanent,
non-participation and labor force turnover must be singled out in addition to job turnover as an
important factor in analyzing unemployment differentials.
" Some evidence is available in Mincer (1987).
24Tabi. 2
FACTORSiN THE INCIDENCEOF uNEMPLOYMENT'
(WhiteMen,PSID, 1976-1981)
Vii-ibles P(u) P(s) P(u/,) Mcmi
Intercept (c) .41 .36 .35 .55 .61 .93 .81 P(u).=.082
(21.6) (15.2) (13.7) (19.5) (15.4) (120) (6.8) P(s)=.l8
EducatIon (Ed) -.018 -.0132 -.008 -.014 -.008 -.036 -.018 P(uI.).47
(14.6) (I 1.1) (9.8) (7.7) (7.8) (6.4) (5.8) 12.7
Experience (x) -.012 -.0076ni. -.018 n.t. n-i. n.e. 17.2
(10.7) (7.0) (9.7)
x2 .0002 .00012 n.e. .00026 n.e. n.e. ni.
(6.6) (4.2) (5,7)
Tenure (Ten) -.021 -.038 -.036 9.1
(15.7) (20.2) (3.9)
Ten2 .00056 .0012 .0011
(11.8) (15.0) (2.6)






-.024 -.076 .083 .35
(3.4) (73) (2.2)
.C07 n.e. .054 .032
(1.6) (2.0)
Training (RQT) -.0026 -.0031 -.010 2.2
(1.8) (2.1) (2.5)
- Recallunemplonattexcludedexceforthefleet left column.





Variables P(U/Q) P(UIL) L
S
(1) (2) (3)
Ed .049 .076 .038
(1.3) (1.8) (2.1)
Ed2 -.003 -.004 -.002
(2.2) (2.5) (2.5)
x -.006 -.006 .009
(1.0) (1.0) (2.6)






S= ratio of layoffs to all separations
P(!)
S= probabilityof unemployment in quits
L=probability of unemployment inlayoffs
26Table 4
TRAININGAND WAGES INCURRENTJOB
(PSID, 1976 AND 1978 pooledfor RQT
1976-1981 forInw)


























PGtotal factor productivity growth in industry 1970-1979
Its level was also included in the wage regression
Source: Conrad and Jorgenson (1985)
NUR = national unemployment rate
In w = logarithmof wages
27Table S
UNEMPLOYMENTINCIDENCE AND THE PROPORTION
OF EDUCATED LABOR BY INDUSTRY, PSID 1976-1981
(i=25, n30)
P(Ed>12) P(Ed>16) RQT
C .56 .27 .34 .06 2.38
(8.4) (1.3) (5.3) (.3) (3.4)
P(U13) -.76 -.56 -.56 -.37 -2.47
(2.5) (1.9) (2.0) (1.5) (2.8)
x .024 .022 n.s.
(2.0) (2.0)
UnM -.31 -.31 -.26
(1.9) (1.9) (1.6)
R2 .37 .32 .24
= Industry,n =samplesize in industry i
C =Intercept
P(U)= Incidenceof unemployment of high school graduates in industry
x =Averageyears of experience in industry
UnM =Unionizationrate in industry
n.s. =Notsignificant
28Table 6
DURATIONOF UNEMPLOYMENT BETWEEN JOBS, AND
WAGE GAINS OF UNEMPLOYED MOVERS, 1976.1981, PSID
Variables Duration Coefficients Wage Gain(Jn W)
coemcknts
(1) (2) (3)
Ed -.56 -.54 .068
(2.0) (2.0) (1.9)
Ed2 -.018 -.017 -.002
(1.6) (1.5) (1.7)
x -.032 .028 -.010
(.9) (.6) (1.0)














Ed = yearsof schooling
u= unemployment rate
29Table 7
RATIOOF RESERVATION WAGE AND NEW JOB WAGE
TO LAST WAGE OF MOVERS, AND AVERAGE DURATION
OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT SPELL, 1980-1982
Education <12 12-15 16+
w1 Unempi. Q .88 1.05 1.23
wo
(12) (22) (6)
UnempL L .82 .78 1.04
(51) (69) (14)
UnempL M .83 .85 1.07
(63) (91) (20)














































Sample sizes in parentheses.
W =reservationwage Q= quits
W0 =lastwage on prior job L =layoffs
=newstarting wage M =allmovers
30Appendix 1
Derivation o( EquatIon 10





This may be rewritten as follows:
cfvf(w)dw -wjf(w)dw




This is correct, if at least one wage offer (vacancy) appears in a unit period. More generally the probability of a
vacancy encountered is p. Also, the gain from search will accrue at least over the period of the next job (t),
hencethe complete equation, taking account of discounting (i), in
c.p P(-w1),whierck'.1---!--t
(1*0
Duration (D') is the inverse of p P. In most plausible distributions (*1.w) moves in the same direction as P.
(Hcckrnan & Flinn). Hence the effects of any of the variables on w1, P1. and D1 are easily shown.
31Appendix 2















Since p1'4, substitute numbers from Table 7 to get
k2112,255 2
hence
k, Discount rate of educated (16+) at most half the size of that of the
least educatedU
k-i-




(1+ 1)'(1 +2i), wheni is small enough.)
k-I-
1 'Hereis the discount rate, U +4)t whereis the payoff period.
p arrival rate of vacancies
=Prob(w >w),w, reservation wage, .- expectationof wage in new job, c -costof search
"Ratiois smaller when the lesser offset by unemployment compensation is taken into account.
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